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FOR RELEASE MONDAY MORNING, JANUARY 24;· 1972 
January ~. , 1972 
STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA) 
THE DISTENDED WAR AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS 
Mr. President: 
While the "winding-down" of the war has been in progress, 
there has also been a falling off in the negotiating effort to achieve 
a cease-fire and complete withdrawal of U. S. forces. In three years 
of "winding-down" the war, 10,000 additional American lives have been 
lost in Indochina, over 45,000 additional Americans have been wounded 
or maimed. All the while, there has been talk of negotiations in Paris. 
There have not been serious negotiations. 
Has it ever been made clear, for example, that the policy of 
this nation seeks the complete withdrawal of U. s. forces from VietNam 
subject only to the condition of a release of the U. S. prisoners of war 
and the recoverable missing in action? Indeed, that is the policy urged 
by a preponderant majority in the Senate. It is the policy apparently 
favored by the House. But it has yet to be set forth clearly as the 
policy of this government. 
There has been a voluminous exchange of words in Paris during 
the past three years. There has been a great deal of mutual pointing of 
the finger of blame. But negotiations there ha~e not been. In the mean-
time, our combattants and theirs have continued to die in Viet Nam. So, 
too, have count less non-involved men, women and children. All t he while, 
t he tentacles of the war's devastation have reached out of Viet Nam ever 
deeper int o Laos and Cambodia. 
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What once was one war, winding-down, has now become three 
wars sealed into one . That was the inevitable consequence of the 
invasion of Cambodia in 1970 and the military adventure into Laos in 
1971. 
Since there is now a war distended to include all of Indo-
china, it is no longer enough to talk of a peace settlement for Viet 
Nam. It is no longer enough to talk of peace only with North Viet Nam. 
In that sense, what has transpired in Paris for many months has been a 
futile exercise. 
If negotiations are to have any chance of succeeding, an 
enlargement of the negotiating table is necessary . Places will have 
to be provided for Laos and Cambodia. But how can the latter speak 
in the negotiations? Who will t alk for the former? 
The Senate may recall that at the conclusion of the second 
Geneva settlement, hopes were reposed in the ability of a three-sided 
government in Vientiane to insure the unity and neutrality of Laos. 
The Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma, held the confidence of 
various Laotian political fac t ions. For a decade, the Prince tried 
to shape a single government of national unity. 
His efforts have been astute and dedicated but they have also 
been in doubt from the very beginning . In the past few years, they have 
broken down completely and the second Geneva Accord has come to be i gnored 
on all sides . For a long time, there has not been anyiEal communication 
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between the Pathet Lao and the government in Vientiane . While the 
former has had the support of North Viet Nam, we have poured hundreds 
of millions of dollars of military and other aid into Vientiane. We 
have supported the Vientiane government not only with money but with 
American planes and paid agents of various nationalities . 
I regret to say it, but it seems to me that our help has 
been so overwhelming that we may well have compromised Prince Souvanna 
Phouma ' s neutral status beyond any expectation of recovery . It is to 
be hoped that such is not the case but I fear that it is so. The only 
prospect for restoring a neutral Laos may now rest in the Royal Capital 
at Luang Prabang. The King of Laos, Sri Savang Va tthana, alone, may 
command sufficient trust and respect among the Laotian political factions 
which , when combined with the quasi - religious loyalty of his people may 
permit him to speak for the entire country with a measure of authority. 
The King has stood outside and above the political struggles. 
As is traditional, questions of State have been left to the Prime Minister 
and the other ministers in Vientiane . The tradition may be too strong to 
be stretched to meet the needs of the present desperate situation. However, 
unless the King is prepared to assume a more direct role of leadership, 
it would be my judgment that a peace will not be achieved whereby Laos 
can survive as an independent nation. The active intercession of this 
one unifying element is urgent to re-establish rapport among the factions 
and for effective Laotian participation in an international settlement 
the 
of/ Indochinese conflict. 
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The future of Cambodia. also appears in grave doubt. Now 
riven by wa.r, Cambodia. ma.y well see its independence undermined not 
only in negotiations but perhaps even by the resumption of historic 
encroachments on its territory. The blunt truth is that the present 
government in Phnom Penh is hapless, helpless a.nd hopeless. Only the 
resources of the United States stand directly a.nd indirectly between 
err 
the continued survival &f~sudden demise of that government. Our policies 
of the past two years have placed us in the unenviable position of chief 
defender of Phnom Penh's military-politicians. In scarcely two years, 
this self-assumed role has already cost the people of the United States 
hundreds of millions of dollars in arms a.nd other a.id a.nd many addi tional 
casualties--dead a.nd wounded--among our military forces in Indochina.. 
The sooner we remove ourselves f rom this situation the better 
for a.ll concerned. However desirable such a. withdrawal, I do not see, 
frankly, much prospect of extricating ourselves until peace is restored 
throughout Indochina.. I a.m confident that the Sena. te is prepared to 
take a. new look a.t the matter a.t a.ny time but there is no indication 
that these sentiments a.re shared in the Executive Branch. As in Laos, 
the best hopes for the restoration of the peace a.nd the preservation of 
a.n independent Cambodia. ma.y lie in international negotiations. 
At the time it occurred, the coup which overthrew Prince 
Norodom Siha.nouk seemed to me a. most regrettable development both from 
the point of view of the interest of this nation a.nd that of the 
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Cambodian people. For more than a decade and a half the Prince had 
dedicated himself with a single-minded zeal to the preservation of 
his country'fs territorial integrity and independence. For a decade 
and a half he kept the war away from the Khmer people. He established 
an oasis of peace and reasonable progress in a war-torn Indochina. 
In retrospect, the overthrow of Sihanouk has proven more 
than regrettable; it has been a tragedy for the Khmer people and it 
has served this naticn's interests not at all. Moreover, our prompt 
support of a successor government of dubious constitutional lineage 
with money, arms and American lives has served to compound the original 
tragedy. It has brought us little more than another expensive dependent 
government, additional casualties, an enlarged war and increased hostility. 
If I may summarize those observations, then, Mr. President, 
let me state the following: 
1. In the search for peace, it should be recognized that we 
are now engaged in three wars which have merged into one Indochina war. 
In the circumstances, the Paris negotiations have lost much of their 
relevance. There is a need to expand these talks to accommodate the 
situation which has developed in the wake of the invasions of Laos 
and Cambodia. 
A change of venue from Paris may also be in order at 
this time. The French government's diplomatic contribution to date 
has been exemplary but it may be more useful now, to shwft negotiations 
to another location, perhaps, closer to the scene of the conflict. 





2. The King should be encouraged in every possible way to 
take a direct hand in restoring the internal political unity of Laos. 
In that fashion it may be possible, via the path of negotiations, to 
bring a return to neutrality and a resoration of peace to that war-torn 
pitiful land. 
3. If there is a source of authentic leadership which might 
serve to restore the unity of Cambodia and preserve for that nation a 
degree of independence, national integrity and peaceful neutrality, it 
is Prince Norodom Sihanouk. In my Judgment there is little hope for a 
settlement of the Cambodian wing of the war along those lines without 
his active participation. 
r, , 
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